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?RESILIENCE? 
 BACK TO BASICS 
Bounce back 
Resistant 
Strength 
Flexible 
Self-reliant 
Good planning 
Solid training 
Regular exercises 
Standards 
Evaluations 
Whole of Community Partnerships and Outreach 
A DISCLAIMER FOR ALL HAZARDS APPROACH 
I am a whole-heartedly, full out advocate of the all hazards approach 
to emergency management. 
I am devoting my time to the pre-disaster activities and outreach in 
behalf of preparedness and mitigation. 
So, as we discuss campus resilience, that is my approach. 
The first step would be conducting a risk assessment, creating an 
informed set of stakeholders who would then begin the 
processes of mitigation, planning, training, higher education, 
exercises, evaluations. 
I would use NFPA 1600 and EMAP guidance and standards, as a 
checklist for a campus program. 
 
INDIVIDUALS 
My grandson at Virginia Tech, a Junior Engineering Student 
Holocaust survivor Professor Liviu Librescu and Alec Calhoun 
In room 204, Norris Hall 
Insisted on students escaping for 22 foot jump to ground out of window 
He held the door closed until most of students out 
Shot multiple times through the door 
One student killed, others injured.   
 
 
VIRGINIA TECH BY THE NUMBERS 
First assault, killed two students. 
During this second assault, Cho fired at least 174 rounds, killing 30 people and 
wounding 17 more. 
All of the victims were shot at least three times each; of the 30 killed, 28 were shot in 
the head. 
During the investigation, State Police Superintendent William Flaherty told a state 
panel that police found 203 live rounds in Norris Hall. "He was well prepared to 
continue…” 
In total, Cho killed five faculty members and 27 students before committing suicide. 
The Virginia Tech Review Panel reported that Cho's gunshots wounded 17 other 
people; six more were injured when they jumped from second-story windows to 
escape. 
FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE 
DETECTING/DISRUPTING THREATS 
While most difficult, this strategy has the greatest poten- 
tial to fully prevent loss of life from an Active Shooter 
situation. 
 It seeks to completely prevent attacks from materializing 
at the facility due to successful mental health and/or 
law enforcement interventions far away from the 
potential target. 
SECOND LINE OF DEFENSE 
REDUCING VULNERABILITIES 
Security strategies for deterring, detecting and delaying 
attacks, once an individual arrives at a facility can 
help reduce casualties and other damage from an 
Active Shooter who does arrive at a protected 
•  combination of armed guards;  
•  quick reaction teams; 
•   integrated gunshot detection alerting 
•   trigger alerts, evacuations, and door closure/lock- 
down procedures and exercises 
THIRD LINE OF DEFENSE 
REDUCING CONSEQUENCES 
 
•   evacuate potential victims and speed treatment to the wounded 
to attempt to reduce the loss of life from the attack 
•  employ police and emergency evacuation and medical response 
drills, resources, and procedures 
•  dependent upon the conclusion of an attack to be effective, so 
last line of defense 
•   the average police response to an Active Shooter scene is 18 
minutes, while the average Active Shooter situation lasts 12.5 
minutes 
•   not suitable by itself as the only response an organization takes 
to defend its facilities and occupants from an Active Shooter 
SYSTEMS 
Do they provide situational awareness to all? 
Is there a good business continuity plan for them? 
Science and Technology Directorate is searching the universe for best of 
breed 
US Department of Education has a Readiness and Emergency 
Management section on their website for best practices, lessons 
learned during the time when they had a vigorous SAFE AND DRUG 
FREE SCHOOLS PROGRAM 
FEMA worked closely with them through the years in behalf of 
preparedness and mitigation for campuses, following Columbine, 
until the program was recommended for elimination by the President 
and Congress 
 
 
FACILITIES/BUILDING 
Physical Security Training 
Draft Plans 
HVAC Systems 
Police 
Alerts 
Assessments of buildings 
Nearby landscaping 
My first job after FEMA was EDS, our physical security was designed 
under Ross Perot’s watch, using architecture, landscaping, and 
engineering to the max 
STANDARDS – EMAP AND NFPA 1600 
Program Management/Administration/Coordinator  
 Advisory Committee 
 Program Evaluation 
Laws and Authorities/Finance and Administration 
Risk Assessment 
Incident Prevention 
Mitigation 
Resource Management and Logistics 
Mutual Aid/Assistance 
 Planning 
 Incident Management/Operational Procedures 
 Communications and Warning 
 Facilities  
Training, Exercises, Evaluations, and Corrective Actions 
Crisis Communication and Public Information 
  
 
 
LET THE CONVERSATIONS CONTINUE 
Kay C. Goss, CEM 
President, World Disaster Management, LLC 
Senior Advisor for EDS and SRA International 
Former Associate FEMA Director for President Clinton 
Senior Assistant for Intergovernmental Relations for 
Governor Clinton 
Kay.goss@post.harvard.edu 
 
 
WHOLE OF COMMUNITY PARTNERSHIPS 
 AND OUTREACH 
Students 
Faculty 
Counselors 
Security 
Administration 
Superintendent 
Board of Education/School Board 
PTA 
City officials – Mayor, Council, Fire, Police, EMS, EM, Public Works, 
Recreation and Parks 
IEMC at FEMA 
Multiple hazard school courses 
Nonprofit leaders 
